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DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE AND
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC
EDUCATION
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the relationship between demographic structure and the level of
govemmentspendingon K-12education. Panel data for the U.S. states over the 1960-1990 period
suggests that an increasein the fraction of elderly residents in ajurisdictionis associated witha
significant reduction inperchild educational spending. This reduction isparticularly large when the
elderly residents and the school-age population are from different racial groups. Variation in the size
of the school-age population does not result in proportionate changes in education spending, so
students in states with larger school-age populations receive lower per-student spending than those
in states with smaller numbers of potential students. These results provide support for models of
generational competition in the allocation of public sector resources. They also suggest that the
effect of cohort size on government-mediated transfers must be considered in analyzing how cohort
size affects economic well-being.
James M. Poterba
Department of Economics, E52-350
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
and NBERSpending on primary and secondary education is the largest expenditure item
it state and local government budgets, While tax-financed public education may
provide some benefits to society and the local community at large, most of the return
to such spending accrues to families with children. The costs of public education
nevertheless fall on households with and without school-age children. In particular,
older households with owner-occupied homes pay local property taxes as well as state
sales and income taxes that ultimately finance K-1 2 education. These generational
differences in the net benefits from publicly-provided education can lead to tensions
in the political process in which education budgets are set. This paper explores the
empirical significance of these generational tensions, and presents evidence
suggesting that during the postwar period, a state’s demographic composition has
affected the level of per-child education spending.
Questions of intergenerational burden-sharing and equity in school finance have
received less attention to date than intra-generational issues such as inequality in
school district spending levels. The prospective aging of the United States’
population, indicated by the projected growth of the population share aged age 65+
from 12,5% in 1990 to 18,7% in 2030, may however lead to heightened generational
tensions and interest in these issues. These issues have already become salient in
debates over Social Security, where younger workers are taxed to finance benefits for
older retirees, The transfers in the public education system flow in the opposite
direction.
The analysis presented below relates more generally to the analysis of how
cohort size affects the well-being of cohort members. Traditional analyses of thisissue in economic
the induced rates
2
demography focus on the supply and demand for workers, and on
of return on various assets. Those in a large cohort must supply
their labor when
real wages than
aggregate labor supply is high, so they are predicted to earn lower
those in relatively smaller birth cohorts. Similarly, when those in
large cohorts decide to save for retirement, they must compete with many other
savers in buying assets, thereby bidding up prices and driving down returns. These
two effects combine to reduce the lifetime utility of those in large birth cohorts
relative to those in smaller cohorts.
This traditional analysis neglects the potentially important role of government
transfers in altering the inter-cohort distribution of resources. Because the level and
direction of government-mediated transfers reflect in part the relative political powers
of different cohorts, those in small cohorts may receive smaller net transfers than
those in larger cohorts. Preston [1984] suggests that such generational competition
is part of the explanation for the relative improvement in the economic status of
elderly households in the U.S., and the decline in the well-being of children, during the
1960-1980 period. This hypothesis is confirmed by at least anecdotal evidence on
public support for various government programs. Recent survey results suggest that
support for increased federal funding of public schools declines from 77 percent if the
respondent is under 30, to 47 percent for those over age 70 [Business Week, 3 April
1995, p. 42].
The theoretical relationship between demographic structure and the age-specific
pattern of government spending is complex, in part because the age-specific benefitsof various government programs
[19861, for example, develop an
3
may be difficult to assess. Richman and Stagner
alternative to Preston’s [19841 hypothesis that a
rising number of elderly households will lead to greater government transfer flows
toward this group. They suggest that rising numbers of dependent elderly may seek
to raise the training of younger workers, both to raise the pool of resources from
which transfers can be funded and to raise the quality of services they receive. Such
alternative hypotheses make the relationship between the age structure of the
population, and the level of age-specific transfers, an issue for empirical research.
The present paper explores the link between cohort size and spending patterns
by focusing on the relationship between state and local education spending per child
and three demographic variables: the share of the population over age 65, the share
of the population of school age (5 through 17), and the difference in the racial
composition of the elderly and school-age populations. The paper is divided into four
sections. The first summarizes previous work on demographic structure and public
spending determination, with particular attention to studies of public education.
Section two presents the econometric specification that provides the basis for this
study, and summarizes the demographic variation across the U.S. states. The third
section presents regression evidence on the association between demographic
structure and education spending, along with “control equations” that relate state and
local spending for activities other than K-1 2 education to the same set of demographic
variables. A brief conclusion suggests several limitations of the current analysis, as
well as directions for future work.4
1. Gove rnment -Mediated Redistrib ution Across Generations
Government-provided retirement pensions, tax-financed national health care
systems that transfer resources from those in the labor force to older individuals, and
publicly provided education are the most prominent examples of government’s
substantial role in intergenerational redistribution. The relative levels of these various
transfers differ substantially across countries. Table 1 presents a cross-national
comparison of per capita social spending on children, middle-aged individuals, and the
elderly in several large OECD nations. Per-child spending has been normalized to 100
for each nation. The table shows that spending on the elderly exceeds that on
children in all of the countries, but that the ratio of spending per elderly individual to
spending per child varies from 2.3 in Japan and Sweden to 3.8 in Italy and the United
States.
The cross-national
share of the elderly in the
data do not suggest an obvious relationship between the
population and the share of government spending devoted
to the elderly or to children. Simple statistics such as those in Table 1 are virtually
impossible to interpret, however, in the absence of other information on the relative
incomes of different cohorts, the costs of providing services in different countries, and
the nature of transfers that are not mediated by the government.l Nevertheless the
data suggest substantial differences across nations in the government transfer
lFurther discussion of international comparisons maybe foundinO’Higgins[19881
and Smeeding, Torrey, and Rein [1988]. For a historical perspective on the growth
of social spending in several OECD nations, with attention to demographic factors, see
Lindert [1996].5
component of the bargain that is struck between generations.
Searching for a link between demographic variables and spending outcomes
raises an obvious question: how should potential demographic effects be modelled?
Because there is no universally-accepted model of political equilibrium, it is difficult
to invoke a maintained model of generational bargaining as a basis for developing
econometric specifications for public spending on education or other directed
expenditure programs that accrue to particular age groups. z Different models can
yield different answers to questions of the form “How will government spending on
children change if the share of older individuals in the population increases?” In a
median-voter framework, the answer to this question depends on whether the
demographic shift changes the identity of the median voter. It is possible to shift the
population age structure without changing the identity of the median voter, and
therefore without affecting the political equilibrium or the age-specific structure of
government transfer payments. In other models of political equilibrium, the relative
size of different voting groups may affect spending outcomes. In this setting, a
natural role for empirical work is to search for robust relationships between various
demographic variables and the level of education spending.
~he notion that different groups within society compete for resources is the
centerpiece of many models of distributive politics, such as that developed by
Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen [1981]. Inman [1987] summarizes the many
possible models that can be considered in analyzing the political process that
determines policy outcomes. The special case of inter-generational bargaining
involves particularly pronounced differences in the objectives of different participants
in the political process, with age the primary determinant of interest group affiliation.
lnman [1978] explicitly models demographic variables as shifting the median position
and hence the behavior of the public sector.6
The political dynamic between different generations reduces to a simple transfer
game when there arenocross-generational effects of directed spending. Whethera
larger generation will succeed in transferring resources from smaller generations to
itself depends, in this case, on the structure of the political process, and the degree
to which protection against such transfers has been afforded to minority groups. This
simple framework ignores cross-generational effects, however, which may be
significant and which can make clear predictions very difficult. If individuals are
altruistically linked to their parents and their children, then spending that raises the
utility of the old will also raise the utility of the young, and vice versa.3 Even without
such altruistic links, there may be cross-cohort direct utility effects associated with
government spending, Spending on public education, for example, may reduce the
incidence of crime and thereby raise utility of the old, while also raising the utility of
the school-age children who receive this education, as well as their parents who are
not required to arrange for private education,4 Such cross-effects make it difficult
to build a satisfactory model of the political process that determines school spending.
In addition to generational affiliation, many other individual characteristics that
may also determine the value of goods that benefit particular population sub-groups.
Cutler, Elmendorf, and Zeckhauser (1993), who label such goods “directed goods, ”
posit that ethnic group affiliation is one such characteristic. They argue that an
3Logan and Spitze [1995] present evidence of substantial intergenerational altruism
with respect to public programs.
4Poterba [1995a] and Lott [1987] provide more detailed discussion of the
externalities associated with public education.7
individual’s support for a particular spending program depends on both age pnd ethnic
proximity to the beneficiaries. This view is supported by anecdotal evidence. In
Holyoke, Massachusetts, the Wall Street Jou rnal [25 November 1991] reports, elderly
white voters support programs that benefit young whites but not programs that
benefit young non-whites, and this has resulted in sharply declining school outlays.
There are many ways to test for links between population age, ethnic
composition and the level and mix of public spending, The cross-national evidence
discussed above is one possibility, with the attraction that demographic composition
differs substantially across nations. A crucial drawback, however, is that there are
differences in the bundles of public goods provided in different nations, as well as
differences in the non-government transfers across generations. Thus it is difficult to
evaluate the cross-national data on government spending.
Studying differences in spending outcomes and demographic structure across
U.S. states, or local jurisdictions such as school districts or counties, represents an
alternative strategy for investigating how demographics affect the composition of
public spending. The U.S. states represent a comparable set of jurisdictions with
widely-available data on public spending, demographic characteristics, and numerous
other variables that might impinge on spending choices. They also operate under
broadly similar political institutions. One drawback of analyzing state-level data on
spending and demographics is that many of the critical decisions on spending levels
are made by voters in local jurisdictions. State average spending levels therefore
conceal substantial heterogeneity within states. Studying local jurisdictions brings a8
different set of empirical problems, since the demographic composition of a small
community cannot be viewed as exogenous, but rather depends on the structure of
local public spending. This can make it impossible to generalize from the local-level
relationship between demographic structure and spending patterns to broader-based
changes.
There have been many previous empirical studies of the determinants of state
spending, and a substantial fraction of these consider education spending in particular,
Cutler, Elmendorf, andZeckhauser[1993] survey much of this work, and present new
empirical evidence relating state- and county-level per capita spending to the fraction
of the population above age 65, below age 18, and the fraction of the county that is
nonwhite. Their analysis combines all types of state and local government spending,
including outlays on public hospitals, nursing homes, and on primary and secondary
education. Separating these spending categories and focusing on particular types of
spending, such as K-12 education spending, offers a more powerful method for
testing hypotheses about demographic mix and spending levels, and motivates the
analysis below.
Rubinfeld and Shapiro [1989] survey the substantial related literature on the
demand for state and local spending on elementary education. The particular issue
of interest in the current context is how demographic factors affect the demand for
school spending, and this question has been considered in several previous studies.
Rubinfeld [1977] analyzes data from a household survey and finds that age of
household head does not have substantial explanatory power for school spending9
preferences, while an indicator variable for whether the household has children in the
local public school system does have a substantial and positive effect on local public
school SUppOrt.6 Button [1 992] finds that elderly Florida residents tend to vote
against school bond issues, although they are not fiscally conservative in general.
Dowries [1 996], however, finds a statistically insignificant relationship between the
fraction of voters with school-aged children and the level of school spending in his
analysis of post-Proposition 13 data on California,
Most of the previous work on the demand for education spending has
concentrated on community-level variables and their impact on local spending, even
though the growing role for state finance in K-12 education suggests that state-wide
demographic patterns may also be of substantial consequence, State-wide referenda
on property tax limits, for example, can have important effects on the level of
education spending in each district, and provide an example of how state voter
interests may affect the opportunity set of a local community. This is one attraction
of using total state and local education spending within a state, as in the analysis
presented below.
2. Emr)irical SDecification and Data Desc rir)tion
The present project focuses on the relationship between state demographic
‘Chomitz (1985) suggests that the relationship between having children in the
schools, and supporting higher spending, is a robust finding that also appears in other
studies. Both this study and Rubinfeld [1977] are concerned with whether an
individual says he or she supports higher school spending, rather than with actual
school spending outcomes.10
composition and the level of per-child education spending in the state. The empirical
specification draws heavily on previous studies of state spending, including early work
by Bergstrom and Goodman [1973] and Borcherding and Deacon [1973] and more
recent studies by Case, Hines, and Rosen [1993] and Poterba [1995b], Although
studies of state-level spending are often motivated with a variant of the median voter
model, in which demographic variables should not affect spending outcomes unless
they affect the median voter’s preferences, many “spending demand” studies justify
including variables on demographic structure by arguing that they shift the local
service production function, i.e. the level of spending that is needed to achieve a
given level of output, rather than the political support for spending.*
The reduced form equation that is estimated below relates the logarithm of M
M 9overnment spending on K-12 education’ (ED/CHILD) to the logarithm of state
real per capita personal income in the state (Y), the logarithm of real federal aid to K-
12 education (FEDAID), the logarithms of the population shares aged 5-17 (KID) and
65+ (OLD), and the logarithms of the population shares that own homes (OWNERS),
are nonwhite (NONWHITE), live in urban areas (URBAN), and live below the poverty
‘Gross [19951 presents in ingenious analysis of the role of demographic variables
in accounting for variation in local public spending. He finds relatively weak evidence
that households with similar demographic characteristics exhibit similar preferences,
but one of the cases for which his evidence is strongest is the homogeneity of
households with school-age children.
7The dependent variable is total government spending on K-12 education divided
by the state population aged 5-17. Using population rather than enrollment as the
divisor avoids the potential endogeneity problems associated with decisions to use
private schools, but it also makes it difficult to interpret the dependent variable as a
per-pupil-expenditure measure for public schools.11
line (POVER~). Both the education spending variable and the federal aid variable
reflect outlays by state as well as local governments, The ED variable is drawn from
various issues of Governme nt Finances, and federal aid to primary and secondary
education is computed from information reported in the Tax Foundation’s publication
Facts and Fiaures on Gove rnment Finance.
Most of the independent variables have been found to be statistically significant
explanatory of state spending in previous empirical studies. Several variables deserve
particular comment, however. The OWNERS variable proxies for the after-tax price
of education spending, since the fraction of state residents who itemize income tax
deductions and therefore can deduct state and local taxes from their federal income
taxes is strongly affected by the percentage of homeowners. It may also capture
differences in taste for educational spending between those who own homes and
those who do not. The NONWHITE variable is interpreted by Cutler, Elmendorf, and
Zeckhauser [1993] as testing whether racial mix affects support for public spending.
It’s interpretation is difficult, however, since it may also proxy for higher moments of
the income distribution, such as the fraction of households with low income levels or
the fraction living in large cities. To allow for these possibilities, some equations
include the logarithm of the fraction of the state’s population living below the poverty
line (POVERTY) or in urban areas (URBAN). The URBAN variable has an independent
rationale for inclusion: it may capture potential differences in the cost of delivering
school services as a function of the spatial distribution of population, as well as
potential taste differences for public spending between urban and rural residents.12
The estimation equation is:
(1) ED/CHILD~ = #0 + fll*Yti + ~2*FEDAlD, + #,*KID, + f14*OLDk
+ f16*OWNERS~ + fle*NONWHITEfi + #?T*URBANti +#O*POVERTYti + Eti.
All of the variables are measured in logarithms, so the estimated coefficients can be
interpreted as “elasticities. ” There is relatively little year-to-year variation in most of
the variables in this specification, so the data base includes observations on each
state every ten years. Since the decennial U.S. Census of Population and Housing
provides the necessary demographic information, it is natural to estimate the model
using data on education spending from fiscal years 1961, 1971, 1981, and 1991.
Nominal values from different years are deflated using the implicit price deflator for
state and local government purchases, as reported in the 199 6 Economic ReDOrt of
Ihe President. All of the analysis is limited to the forty-eight continental states, so
there are a total of 192 state-year observations.
There are many state-specific factors that may affect per capita government
spending in a state, such as a high average wage which raises the cost of hiring
teachers. There are also time-specific factors, such as the rise of court- and
legislature-imposed special education spending. To recognize the potential influence
of such effects, the equations are estimated allowing for state and time fixed effects
in the estimation, so that ~fi = di + ~, + Jk. In this case the coefficients of interest
are identified from within-state (over time) variation in demographic structure that can
~ be explained by economy-wide shocks to demographics or spending levels.





logs are used in
means and standard deviations of variables in levels, even
the estimation. The mean level of per-child spending in the
is $3058, with a coefficient of variation of slightly less than one third.
Although summary statistics from single-year cross section data sets are not reported
in Table 2, the coefficient of variation for per-child
section years is very similar to that in the panel. The
spending in each of the cross-
key demographic variables also
display substantial variation. The standard deviation of the share of the population
aged 5-17 is .034, and the analogous measure for the population share aged 65+ is
.022. The most youthful state has 29.6% of its population in the 5-17 age group,
and its school age population share is twice as high the share in the oldest one. The
population share aged 65+ in different states ranges from 5.4°A to 18,2Y0.
The NONWHITE
the state-year sample.
variable ranges from near zero to more than forty percent in
The average value of NONWHITE is .117, but this masks a
substantial trend over time. This fraction rises by more than four percentage points,
on average, between 1960 and 1990. The cross-sectional standard deviation of
NONWHITE declines over the sample period.E
Rather than focusing on the NONWHITE coefficient as a test of ethnic group
competition, the present analysis focuses on how differences in racial composition
‘Nonwhites have historically been less likely than whites to vote, although racial
differences in voter turnout have declined in recent years [see Filer, Kenny, and
Morton, 1991 ]. Changes in nonwhite voter participation could lead to variation over
time in the size and interpretation of the coefficient on this variable.14
~ the elderly and the school-age population affect the level of school
spending.s Thekeyexplanatory variable isthe fraction of non-whites in the school
age (5-1 7) group, minus the fraction of non-whites in the elderly (65+) population.
The mean and standard deviation for this variable are shown in the last row of Table
2. On average, the nonwhite share of the school aged population is 6.5 percentage
points higher than the nonwhite share of the 65+ population. There is substantial
range and variation in this aspect of demographic structure, with the maximum
difference 23.2% (Florida) and the smallest -0.6Y0. West Virginia and Maine are the
only continental states with a greater non-white share in the over-65 population than
in the school-age population. The mean difference in the nonwhite population shares
increased by nearly six percentage points between 1960 and 1990,
There are substantial differences across states in the degree of ethnic and age
heterogeneity. Florida exhibits the greatest disparity between the fraction of
nonwhites in the 5-17 population and that in the 65+ population; this is largely the
result of immigration by elderly white households and younger Latino households. The
other high-disparity states include a number of states in the industrial North, such as
New York, New Jersey, and Illinois, as well as several states from the South, such as
Mississippi and South Carolina.
~here is in principle no link between the NONWHITE variable and the differential
racial composition of the two groups, One could envision a state with a large
nonwhite population spread evenly across the age distribution, as well as one with a
young nonwhite population and few elderly nonwhites, Thus NONWHITE could be the
same in two cases, but the differential age composition variable would be very
different.15
Given the difficulties of interpreting the various coefficients in the reduced form
model described above, it is helpful to estimate a “control specification” that may
provide evidence on spurious relationships. To this end, the ED/CHILD variable in
equation (1) is replaced with NONED/POP, the level of per-capita spending on
programs gther than education. Estimating this equation can provide some insight on
whether demographic and other variables are simply capturing differences across
states inthe taste for public spending, or whether they are capturing allocative effects
with respect to education and other programs.
3. EmDirical Evidence on Demou rar)hic Var iation and Educat on SDe i ndin~
This section presents the central empirical findings with respect to demographic
variation and education spending. The first sub-section reports the basic results,
while the second sub-section considers several models in which demographic
structure is interacted with other variables that might alter its impact on spending
levels.
3.1 Results f om Bas c St)ec r i ificat ions
Table 3 presents the results of estimating regression models for school
expenditures without the variable measuring the ethnic differences between the
elderly and school-age population. The parallel equations in Table 5 include this
variable in the specification, Tables 4 and 6 present similar regression models in16
which the dependent variable is per capita non-school direct spend ing.10 For
completeness, the first column in each table shows the effect of ordinary least
squares estimation without either state or time fixed effects. The equations in all
subsequent columns include these effects.
The results in Table 3 suggest that the fraction of children and elderly in the
population affect per-child spending on education. The share of elderly in the
population is negatively related to this spending variable in the equations that include
state and time fixed effects, These estimates suggest an elasticity of per-child
spending with respect to the over-65 population share of approximately -.25. The
results are attenuated when the fraction of the population in urban areas is included
in the specification; in this case the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant
at conventional significance levels. The estimates in either the second or fourth
column of Table 3 imply that a one standard deviation change in the share of elderly
in the population, a shift from .108 to ,130, results in almost of five percent decline
in per-pupil education spending, The results suggest that all else equal, jurisdictions
with more elderly voters spend less on public schools.ll
10The FEDAID variable in the control equations for non-education spending is the
same variable, federal aid for K-1 2 education, as in the education equations. While
this is not ideal from the standpoint of explaining cross-state variation in non-
education spending, it does provide a check for spurious results in the education
equation.
llA key issue for future research is ~ they spend less. This may simply reflect
a lack of support among elderly voters for public programs that do not benefit the
elderly, or it may reflect a higher cost of raising funds in states with more elderly
because of pre-existing demands that elderly populations place on public coffers.17
These results are strengthened by comparing them with the “control equation”
findings in Table 4, where the estimates suggest that a larger elderly population in a
state leads to higher spending on non-education programs. Thus it does not appear
that the fraction of elderly individuals in the population is simply capturing a tendency
for elderly voters to support lower levels of public spending in general.
The fraction of the population of school-age also has a strong effect on per-
child spending. In the OLS equation in the first column, the estimated elasticity is -
.40, while after the equations include controls for state and time effects, the
estimated elasticity rises to nearly -1.0. These results, if interpreted literally, suggest
that education spending per capita is indeDenden~ of the share of school-aged
children, suggesting that an increase in the population share in this age group leads
to a proportionate reduction in per-child spending.
These striking results should be viewed with caution for several reasons. First,
the “control equations” in Table 4 suggest that a higher population share of school
age reduces non-school spending per capita, with an elasticity of approximately -.30.
The results in Table 3 suggest that per caD @ i school spending is independent of the
fraction of school-aged children in the population. This implies that an increase in the
school-aged population reduces state and local government spending per capita, but
raises the share of such spending that flows to education.
Second, the differences between the results of the OLS estimation (Table 3
column 1)and the fixed effects specification may indicate that economy-wide changes
in the share of children in the population are associated with different types of18
spending response than idiosyncratic, state-specific demographic shocks.
Conventional wisdom holds that rising K-1 2 enrollments were a key factor in the
growth of state and local spending in the late 1950s and 1960s, and again in the
1990s. The specifications that allow for year effects remove such systematic
changes in the size of the school-age population from the analysis. If the enrollment
in a single state rises, competitive tax pressures and other factors may lead to smaller
spending increases than when the school-aged population in the entire economy
increases.
Finally, the results suggesting a strong negative effect of student cohort size
on spending per pupil are consistent with a number of previous studies of spending
on public schools. Case, Hines, and Rosen [1993] find significant negative effects of
the school-aged proportion of the population on per-child school spending, even
though several earlier studies, including Denzau [1975], Ladd [1975], and Megdal
[1984], found small effects. Borge and Rattso [1995] find slow adjustment to
demographic shocks in the composition of spending in Norway, along with a negative
correlation between group size and per-person spending. Further analysis of the link
between cohort size and per-pupil spending, perhaps using changes in enrollment that
result from exogenous shocks such as changes in school district boundaries, seems
warranted .12
12 Equations not reported here also explored how other demographic variables, such
as the number of children per household or the fraction of households with children,
are related to the level of education spending. These variables did not have
statistically significant effects on school spending per child after the current variables
(school-age share and elderly share) were included in the regressions.19
A central issue in interpreting these results is whether they arise from
differences in the “demand” for educational spending, mediated through the political
process, or differences in the technology of supplying educational services to
jurisdictions with different demographic characteristics. It seems reasonable to
exclude the share of the local population over the age of 65, and the ethnic
composition of this group, from the education production function. This suggests that
the demographic effects associated with these variables are likely to result from
demand-side factors. Interpretation of the effect of fluctuations in the school-age
population is more difficult, because economies of scale in education could make it
possible to deliver the same education to a larger cohort with less than a proportionate
expansion in educational spending. This is an issue that requires further exploration,
The estimated effects of the other independent variables in Tables 3 and 4 can
be described briefly. The relationship between per capita income and per child school
spending is weak but positive, and is highly affected by the inclusion of state and time
fixed effects as well as the fraction of the state population living below the poverty
line. Without POVERTY in the specification, the estimated income elasticity of school
spending is approximately .50; without this variable, the income elasticity is on the
order of. 75. Federal grants to the state have a statistically significant positive effect
on the level of per-child school spending, although once again the coefficient is
substantially reduced when state and time effects are included in the model.
States with a higher fraction of homeowners spend more on education,
consistent with the view that homeowners face a lower marginal tax price of public20
spending. The OWNERS variable may also capture differences in the taste for public
spending on education between homeowners and renters. The NONWHITE fraction
of the population does not exhibit strong predictive power for the level of per-child
spending. Including the URBAN variable has little effect on the coefficient of the
share of the population of school age, but it does reduce the coefficient on the share
of elderly individuals in the population. The URBAN variable has a significant effect
on spending as well, with a one percent increase in the state population in urban areas
reducing per-child spending by about 0.4 percent.
Table 5 presents results that are similar to those in Table 3, but each
specification now includes the variable for racial heterogeneity between the 5-17 and
65+ segments of the population. While the estimated coefficient on this variable is
positive in the OLS estimates, the coefficient is negative (although not statistically
significant at standard confidence levels) when the model includes state and time
effects. Including this variable does not substantially affect the estimated coefficients
for either the aged share or school-aged share of the population.
The estimates suggest that demographic heterogeneity can have a substantively
important effect on education spending. The point estimates for this variable must
be interpreted differently from those for other variables, because this variable is
entered in levels rather than logarithms. The estimate in Table 5, column 2 suggests
that a one percentage point increase in the share of nonwhites in the O-17 population,
holding the share of nonwhites in the 65+ population constant, reduces the log of21
per-child school spending by -.006, or approximately one half of one percent.13
These findings suggest that an increase in the fraction of a jurisdiction’s population
over the age of 65 tends to reduce per-child school spending, and that the effect is
especially pronounced when the elderly residents are from a different ethnic group
than the school-aged population. 14
Table 6 presents results similar to those in Table 5, but with per capita non-
school spending as the dependent variable. The results for the racial heterogeneity
variable are distinctly different from those in Table 5. The coefficient estimates are
positive, and in all four specifications the null hypothesis of zero effect can be
rejected. These results bolster the argument that demographic heterogeneityy tends
to reduce spending on education, particularly in relation to spending on other
programs.
3*2 Facto rs that Affect the Demos rar)hv-SDend ina Link
The results in the last subsection suggest that the elderly fraction in the
population affects the level of per-child school spending, and that racial heterogeneity
l~he demographic heterogeneity variable is included in levels, rather than logs,
because it takes some negative values. The standard deviation of the percentage of
whites in the over-65 (O-17) population is .084 (.116). Because these two
percentages covary positively, however, the standard deviation of their difference is
only .047.
14T0 explore the robustness of the findings on demographic heterogeneity, I
separated this variable into two separate variables, (% Nonwhite Age 5-17) and (Yo
Nonwhite Age 65+ ), and included both in the regression specification, The resulting
estimates did not reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on these two
variables are of opposite signs but equal absolute value,22
across age groups can also have a negative effect on such spending. This subsection
explores two aspects of this interaction: whether these effects are stronger in states
with a high degree of population mobility, and whether these effects




To address the impact of population mobility, a variable from the decennial
census indicating the fraction of the state population that resided in the state five
years ago is added to the basic specification. This variable is also interacted with the
logarithm of the elderly share of the population, and the difference in the racial mix
between the 65+ and school-age population. The resulting equation estimates are
shown in the first two columns of Table 7. The estimates in the first column suggest
that states with low population turnover (high values of Percent in State Five Years
Ago) spend more per child on public schools, although the estimated effects are not
statistically significantly different from zero.
There isalso evidence of an intriguing, but imprecise, interaction effect with the
percent elderly in the population. In a state in which all of the residents had been
there five years ago, the percent elderly variable would have essentially no effect on
school spending. In a state with only half of the population resident for five or more
years, the estimated elasticity of school spending with respect to the elderly share
would be -.50.15 The interaction effects with respect to the racial heterogeneity
16The fraction of five year residents varies between .64 and .94 in the panel data
sample, with a standard deviation of .059 and a mean of ,86.23
variable operate in the same direction, so the effect of this variable is reduced when
the state’s population consists of primarily long-term residents. However, the effects
in this case are estimated with too little precision for further discussion.
The last two columns of Table 7 report estimates of equations that include an
indicator variable for whether or not the state has a property tax circuit-breaker
provisionlo, and interactions of this variable with the demographic variables. The
effects are similar to those for the long-term residence variable. States with property
tax circuit breakers exhibit higher per-child school spending, and in such states, the
effect of a rising share of elderly in the population is also reduced. The standard
errors for both of the relevant coefficients are roughly as large as the estimated
coefficients, however, so it is difficult to draw strong conclusions. When the circuit-
breaker variable is interacted with the
heterogeneity coefficient itself falls to
variable measuring racial heterogeneity, the
nearly zero, and the estimates suggest that
states with circuit-breaker laws have larger negative effects of racial heterogeneity.
Once again, however, the estimated effects are not significant at conventional levels
of statistical significance.
The link between property tax circuit breakers and demographic tension is an
issue that warrants further study. Better information on the nature of circuit-breakers,
particularly on whether they apply only to elderly residents or to all residents, would
result in more precise tests of how demographics interact with these institutions. In
l~hese variables are created by referring to various publications of the Advisory
Council on Intergovernmental Relations.24
addition, the circuit breakers are examples of endogenous fiscal institutions, and
further work could explicitly model this endogeneity and attempt to find valid
instruments for studying the effect of circuit breakers on spending levels.
4. co nclusions
This paper presents empirical results suggesting that demographic structure
affects the level and composition of public spending, The empirical analysis, which
focuses on public spending for K-12 education, indicates that an increase in the
fraction of elderly residents in a state is associated with a significant reduction in u
Child educational spending. This reduction is even larger when the elderly residents
are predominantly from a different racial group than the school-age population. These
results suggest that students who are part of larger school-age cohorts receive lower
per-student spending than those in smaller cohorts. 17
These findings, if they in fact reflect tensions between generations in the
allocation of public funds, suggest that the changing demographic profile of the United
States may lead to long-term reductions in the level of per-child school expenditure.
Projections suggesting that the fraction of the population aged 65+ will rise from
12.5 percent in 1990 to 18.7 percent in 2030, would translate (using the central
estimates in the present study) into a ten percent reduction in per child spending. The
17 Figlio (1997) relates the level of per pupil spending in the late 1980s to changes
in enrollment in the late 1970s, and finds evidence that rising enrollment is associated
with lower spending levels. This raises issues about the long-term persistence of
demographic effects and warrants further exploration,25
implications of such changes for income inequality and economic growth depend on
controversial parameters linking school spending to school outcomes and wages, but
the potential effects could be substantial.
These results raise, but do not resolve, questions about how fiscal institutions
and the structure of the political process more generally may affect the degree of
generational tension in allocating public spending. Mechanisms that move education
finance closer to benefit taxation, such as property tax circuit-breakers, are one device
that might be used to reduce generational conflict. Tying education spending to
programs that benefit other community residents, for example building a school that
is used as an elder center for part of the week, is another option. The prospective
decline in the share of the population with children in public school systems may
dictate greater attention to these mechanisms.
The results presented in this paper raise a number of broader issues for
evaluating how demographic change is likely to affect the structure of government
programs. First, the mechanism through which demographic structure affects the
composition of government spending requires further analysis. If a particular
demographic group such as the elderly place substantial demands on the public sector,
and this raises non-education government spending, then the shadow cost of funds
for education will rise, and this spending program is likely to contract. Second, it is
possible that elderly voters do not assign high priority to spending for education, In
this case, jurisdictions where elderly voters are more important will spend less on
education as a result of the different tastes of their voting population. Further work26
is needed to disentangle these alternative explanations of the empirical findings,
Finally, the results suggest the potential importance of normative questions
concerning community composition. Benabou [1995] and Schwab and Oates [1991],
among others, have analyzed the problem of optimal community structure, with
particular attention to the optimal degree of heterogeneity in community composition;
the present findings suggest the potential relevance of these studies in considering the
age composition of communities.
James M. Poterba, Mitsui Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of
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Table 1: Relative Per-Capita Social Spending By Age Group, 1980
-------------------------- -------------------------- -------------- ------------------------ -------------------------
Relative Spending (Age 0-14 = 100) Population Share
Ages 15-64 Ages 65+ Aged 65+
--------------------------- ---------------- ------------------------ ----------------------------- -------------------
Canada 72 265 9,5%
France 51 263 14.0
Germany 60 316 15.5
Italy 110 380 13.5
Japan 44 235 9.1
Sweden 43 234 16.3
United Kingdom 54 213 14.9
United States 67 381 11.3
-------------------- -------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Columns one and two are drawn from OECD [1988a], Table 18. Column
three is from [1988bl, Table 3.1.Table 2: Summary Statistics, 1961-1991 Panel Data Set
--------- ------ ---------------- --.--- ------ ------ -------------------- ------ ----------------------------------------
Standard Maximum/
Variable Mean Deviation Minimum






































































Notes: Monetary values are reported in 1992 dollars, with deflation across years
using the National Income and Product Accounts deflator for government purchases
of goods and services. The sample consists of the 48 continental United States for
the years 1961, 1971, 1981, and 1991.33
Table3: Determinants of Per Child School Spending: Age-Related Demographics
----------------------------------- ------------------------ -------------------- ------------------------------------




















































































-------- -------------------- ----------------------------------- ... .... ... ..... .. ... ....... .....- -------------------
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Monetary values are reported in
1992 dollars. All variables are in logarithms. The sample consists of the 48
continental United States for the years 1961, 1971, 1981, and 1991.34
Table4: Determinants of Per Capita Non-School Direct Spending
------------------------ -------------------------------- ---------------------- --------------------------- ----------
Variable OLS With State and Time Fixed Effects















































































0.730 0.923 0.922 0.923
----------------- ------------------------- ------------------------- ---------------------- --------------------------
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses, Monetary values are reported in
1992 dollars. All variables are in logarithms. The sample consists of the 48
continental United States for the years 1961, 1971, 1981, and 1991.35
Table5: Determinants of Per Child School Spending:
Age Distribution and Ethnic Composition Effects
---------------------- --------------------- ----------------------------- ---------------------------- ---------------
Variable OLS With State and Time Fixed Effects





























































































------------ ------------------------------ ------------------------------------- ------------------------- -----------
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Monetary values are reported in
1992 dollars, All variables are in logarithms except for the difference between the
nonwhite shares of the population aged 5-17 and 65+. The sample consists of the
48 continental United States for the years 1961, 1971, 1981, and 1991.36
Table6: Determinants of Per Capita Non-Education Direct Spending
Age Distribution and Ethnic Composition Effects
-------------------------- --------------------- ------------------- --------------- --------------- -------------------
Variable OLS With State and Time Fixed Effects






























































































Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Monetary values are reported in 1992
dollars, All variables are in logarithms except for the difference between the nonwhite
shares of the population aged 5-17 and 65 +. The sample consists of the 48 continental
United States for the years 1961, 1971, 1981, and 1991,37
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0.954 0.954 0.954 0.955
.........................................................................................................................................
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Monetary values are reported in 1992 dollars. All equations
include state and time fixad effects. All variables are in logarithms except for the difference between the
nonwhite shares of the population aged 5-17 and 65+. The sample consists of the 48 continental United
States for the yaars 1961, 1971, 1981, and 1991.